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“They're nothing but exasperating, irritating, vacillating, calculating, agitating, 
maddening, and infuriating lags.” Adapted (“hags” to “lags”) from “A Hymn to 
Him”, copyright Alan Jay Lerner and Frederick Lowe.  
 
 
 
Abstract: We survey arguments that family firms should behave more like 
non-family firms and “professionalize”. Despite the apparent advantages of 
this transition, many family firms fail to do so or do so only partially. We 
reflect on why this might be so, and the range of possible modes of 
professionalization. We derive six ideal types: (1) minimally professional 
family firms; (2) wealth dispensing, private family firms; (3) entrepreneurially 
operated family firms; (4) entrepreneurial family business groups; (5) 
pseudo-professional, public family firms; and (6) hybrid professional family 
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firms. We conclude with suggestions for further research that is attentive to 
such variation.  
 
Keywords: Professionalization; family firms; performance; entrepreneurship; 
hybrid organizations  
 
Introduction  
 
Professor Higgins’ rant (above) and his refrain: “why can’t a 
woman be more like a man?” conveyed his view that the world would 
be better off if women would act more like men (My Fair Lady, adapted 
by Lerner and Lowe from George Bernard Shaw’s play Pygmalion). The 
play and the musical had fun with his stereotypes about the sexes. 
“Higgins… is a comical figure, … a self-opinionated [and] clueless 
misogynist” (Izod, 2006, p. 46; McGovern, 2011, p. 270). We can 
laugh at his delusions, but there are echoes of his attitude in a 
respectable view about family businesses: would the world not be 
better off if they would act more like non-family businesses?  
 
Business historians Alfred Chandler (1990) and David Landes 
(1949) viewed surviving family businesses2 as the relics of an earlier 
era. Echoes of this view are not hard to find. For example, the fifth 
edition of Sociology by Giddens and Griffiths (2006, p. 657) claimed 
that “in the large corporate sector, family capitalism was increasingly 
succeeded by managerial capitalism… [and] the entrepreneurial 
families were displaced.” Similarly, Wharton professor Michael Useem 
saw in Vivendi’s purchase of the Seagram Company “one more nail in 
the demise of family capitalism” (Anonymous, 2000). The persistence 
of this attitude is not for lack of counter claims by recent family 
business and business history scholars. For example, Ingram and 
Lifschitz (2006, p 351) opposed seeing “the residue of family 
capitalism as an unfortunate anachronism, a social indulgence that 
acted as a brake on the progress to corporate capitalism.” Many other 
such arguments can be found, and Landes came to disavow Chandler’s 
views (2006, pp. xii-xv; also Carr & Bateman, 2009; Colli, Fernández 
Pérez, & Rose, 2003; Gilding, 2005; Schulze & Gedajlovic, 2010).  
 
Some scholars who recognize the continuing vitality of family 
businesses nonetheless believe that these firms would be more 
effective if they would behave more like non-family businesses. Their 
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argument is typically couched in the language of “professionalization.” 
As an example, Martínez, Stöhr, and Quiroga (2007, p. 93) proposed 
that “when family-controlled firms professionalize their management 
and governance bodies, and have to be accountable to minority 
shareholders, they can overcome most of their traditional weaknesses 
and take advantage of their strengths and succeed.” Contentions along 
these lines are common (e.g., Rondøy, Dibrell, & Craig, 2009; Schulze 
et al., 2001; Sciascia & Mazzola, 2008; Westhead & Howorth, 2006). 
Similar arguments also appear in the practitioner press (from Canada, 
Robinson, 2007; from India, Sukumar, 2011; from the Middle East, 
Anonymous, 2008; from South America, Anonymous, 2007; from the 
U.S.A., Perry, 2008). By contrast, we argue that we need a greater 
understanding of the modes of family firms and of their contexts to 
know how they can operate more effectively. Our essay is designed to 
provide more contingent answers to this important question.  
 
We proceed as follows. First, we survey the literature and 
assemble a number of dichotomies associated with family versus non-
family business. These dichotomies suggest the range of possible ways 
in which family firms might become more like non-family firms. We 
next survey direct arguments in favor of transitioning to a less familial 
form of organization. We also summarize the indirect arguments based 
on studies of performance effects. A reasonable inference from these 
studies is that professionalizing the family firm improves performance. 
We are led to a conundrum: despite direct and indirect arguments in 
favor of professionalization, a great many family firms fail to follow 
this prescription. As a result, we propose reasons why family firms 
might or might not make the transition, leading to different modes of 
professionalization. We conclude with suggestions for further research.  
 
Distinctions between Family and Non-Family 
Firms  
 
Scholarly writings on family business offer a range of 
dichotomies between “family firms” and non-family firms”. Table One 
classifies some of the often-cited dichotomies, with representative 
citations. Insofar as we accept these broad stereotypes of family and 
non-family businesses, it is hard not to conclude that family 
businesses compare poorly by the standards taught in business 
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schools (Johannisson, 2002; Khurana, 2007; Sarasvathy, 2001). Many 
scholars would endorse the argument for a thoroughgoing 
transformation of family firms if these dichotomies accurately reflect 
reality.  
_______________________ 
Insert Table One about here 
_______________________ 
 
Meanings of “Professionalization”  
 
We lack a singular term in our literature for such a 
transformation. “Familiness”, for example, is a term with a more 
specific meaning (Habbershon, Williams & MacMillan, 2003; 
Habbershon, 2006). The term that comes closest is 
“professionalization”. However, it is only a short-hand for all of the 
distinctions in Table One. It does not typically refer to ownership. It 
also lacks a singular meaning in popular or scholarly discourse (Hwang 
& Powell, 2009; von Nordenflycht, 2010). In its simplest form, it refers 
to full-time salaried employees (Galambos, 2010). By a simple 
extension to family firms it means hiring full-time, non-family 
employees, particularly with the delegation of managerial authority. In 
studies of family firms, this is often the core meaning (Chandler, 1990, 
pp. 48, 145, 240, 266-268, 390; Chittoor & Das, 2007; Gedajlovic, 
Lubatkin, & Schulze. 2004). A closely related theme in Chandler’s 
account is “defining [the] organizational structure precisely” so as to 
coordinate the work of the salaried managers (1990, p. 127; also 
Chua, Chrisman & Bergiel, 2009; Songini & Gnan, 2009). Thus, the 
term implicitly or explicitly entails other dimensions, such as formal 
training, meritocratic values, formalized structures or independent 
directors (e.g., Chua et al., 2009; Chua, Chrisman, & Sharma, 1999; 
Parada et al., 2010; Tsui-Auch, 2004). As a result, it is sometimes 
used to refer to a holistic transformation (Hung & Whittington, 2011). 
Relationships among the dimensions. Professionalization is 
certainly not one-dimensional. For example, hiring salaried managers 
absent other changes is a failing strategy (Sukumar, 2011; Ward, 
2004). Professionalizing therefore can involve a holistic change, albeit 
one that varies somewhat from firm to firm (Hung & Whittington, 
2011; Parada, Nordqvist & Gimeno, 2010). Based on our review, if 
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there is a core element to such a shift in the context of family firms, it 
is the Parsonian distinction between achievement and ascription 
(Parsons, 1951). In Ward’s terms (2004, pp. 51-52) this is “the 
principle of merit.” In other words, people are placed in positions and 
rewarded based on merit. Implementing the principle of merit in firms 
where it had been lacking often requires a shift across several 
managerial dimensions. Depending on the availability of talent it could 
entail the hiring of salaried managers or even a non-family CEO. It 
could entail new systems and organizational designs in order to 
monitor and reward managerial performance.  
 
Professionalization is multi-dimensional, but we cannot assume 
that the applicability of any one of these dichotomies, in a given firm, 
entails the applicability of others. For example, informality need 
coexist with indulgence. To assume that it does so is to assume that 
the construct is “reflective” of co-varying indicators (the dimensions). 
Many important constructs in business literatures are “formative” or 
caused by indicators that may have negative or zero correlations 
(Diamantopoulos, Riefler & Roth, 2008). To assume the former in the 
absence of evidence is a common error of “protoscientific” thinking 
(Graham, 1989, p. 338).  
 
Moreover, the stereotypical dichotomies of Table One do not 
identify family and non-family businesses as distinct configurations or 
“gestalts” (Miller, 1981). None of these dichotomies, with the possible 
exception of kin- or nonkin-based ownership, uniquely defines a family 
versus a non-family firm, and even this distinction is not definitive. 
The qualities that are attributed to family firms and to non-family firms 
are not universally applicable. Some family firms have highly educated 
managers using analytical decision-making and some non-family firms 
have casually trained managers using intuitive decision-making. 
Further, family firms are associated with nepotism, but the principle of 
merit is not the exclusive property of non-family business. 
Professionalizing the family firms often includes educating the 
succeeding generation in high quality business schools (Benedict, 
1968; Douglass 1992, pp. 223, 225; Gilding, 2005; Pérez-González, 
2006; Tsui-Auch & Lee, 2003; Tsui-Auch, 2004). Moreover, merit does 
not presuppose that the goals to be “achieved” must be purely 
economic.  
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An Alternative Meaning of Professionalization  
 
Table One includes (under “management”) a distinctive meaning 
of professionalization. This usage, found in both popular and scholarly 
language, has roots in occupational groups with jurisdictional rights to 
the use of specialized knowledge, such as attorneys and physicians 
(Abbott, 1988; Galambos, 2010). Managers do not enjoy these 
jurisdictional rights (Hodgson, 2005; Hwang & Powell, 2009). 
Nonetheless, the notion of “professional management” carries 
connotations from these older occupations (Khurana, 2007, pp 69-70). 
A true professional is expected to develop not only generally applicable 
knowledge but also to adopt a moral code and to view the career as a 
“calling” (Benveniste, 1987, pp. 42-43). Professionals are expected to 
continue to “improve [their] capabilities” (Hall, 1968; Hwang & Powell, 
2009, p. 268; also Chittoor & Das, 2007) and also to display integrity 
to “protect the interests of clients and/or society in general” (von 
Nordenflycht, 2010, p. 163).  
 
Ironically, this older meaning of “professionalization” is at odds 
with other connotations of professionalization. According to the 
stereotypes, management in family firms is less formalized, rational 
and standardized than in non-family firms. Insofar as professionalism 
means moving toward a non-family business in this senses it entails 
bureaucratizing. Yet professionalism with this older meaning was 
offered as an alternative to bureaucracy (Benveniste, 1987) because 
the more the firm delegates responsibility to professionals the less 
bureaucracy is needed (Hall, 1968). We return to this point in 
addressing why family firms may resist the move to professionalize.  
 
Benefits of Professionalizing  
 
Professionalizing the family firm by developing non-personalized 
“evaluation and incentive compensation” (Chua et al., 2009, p. 355) 
can be appropriate in family firms. Tsao and colleagues (2009, p. 320) 
found that family firms benefit from the use of “extensive selection, 
performance-based pay, in-house training and development, job 
enrichment, and employee empowerment.” Family firms adopting 
these practices (termed High Performance Work Systems) 
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outperformed non-family firms, whereas those that did not do so 
underperformed non-family firms. Similar practices may also crack the 
glass ceiling for females in family firms (Parada et al., 2010), because 
they provide means to certify that female managers gained their 
positions based on achievement (Songini & Gnan, 2009). Other 
benefits of professionalizing human resource practices are methods for 
disciplining non-performing kin (Ram, 1994, p. 64), and higher 
commitment from non-family employees (Barnett & Kellermanns, 
2006; Dyer, 1989; Gilding, 2005; Janjuha-Jivraj & Woods, 2002).  
 
Many other benefits have been proposed for professionalization. 
These include comporting with institutional forces, whether ideological 
or coercive. An example of institutional compatibility is that the value 
placed on individual careers may be satisfied by the use of trust funds 
and their attendant “corporate, bureaucratic affairs” that free the next 
generations for alternative professions (Marcus & Hall, 1992, p. 8; also 
Farrell, 1993, pp. 52-58). Similarly, the value placed on merit in the 
wider culture may be satisfied by elite education for the successor 
generation (De Lima, 2000; Hall & Nordqvist, 2008). Cultural norms 
such as these are reinforced by governmental and quasi-governmental 
agencies and by family business associations (Hung & Whittington, 
2011; Parada et al, 2010; Selekler-Goksen & Öktem, 2009).  
 
The “functionalist” argument for professionalization (Yildirim-
Öktem & Üsdiken, 2010, p. 117) holds that it is needed in order to 
cope with complex and competitive business environments (Casson, 
2000; Chandler, 1990, pp. 268, 339; Walsh, 2010) and to pursue 
opportunities for business alliances with professionally managed 
companies (Benedict, 1968; Ravasi & Marchisio, 2003; Rondøy, 
Dibrell, & Craig, 2009). One reason for this benefit is the increased 
diversity of perspectives and experiences available when outsiders join 
the board or executive suites (Filatotchev, Lien, & Piesse, 2005; 
Hatum, Pettigrew, & Michelini, 2010).  
 
The other main business argument for professionalization is 
financial: better terms with banks, greater likelihood of raising private 
equity, and opportunities to obtain capital in public equity markets 
(Barden, Copeland, Hermanson, & Wat, 1984; Dawson, 2011; Ravasi 
& Marchisio, 2003). Owners gain from cheaper capital, enhanced 
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opportunities for growth and acquisitions, and diversification of their 
assets, particularly if they take their firms public (Bancel & Mittoo, 
2008; Pástor, Taylor, & Veronesi, 2009). The process of preparation 
for going public also reduces the taxes and conflicts as one generation 
retires and another succeeds in its place (Chrisman, Chua, Sharma & 
Yoder, 2009; Janjuha-Jivraj & Woods, 2002).  
 
Performance Effects of Family Involvement  
 
These financial advantages should be reflected in studies 
comparing the performance of family and non-family firms. Therefore, 
we analyzed 59 empirical studies regarding the effect of family 
involvement on performance.3 These are summarized in Table Two. 
Naturally, only accounting or operational measures and not market 
(financial) measures can be used with privately held firms, and only 15 
of the 59 studies contain such performance data. Because the great 
majority of family firms are private, we distinguish studies with 
samples of public firms from those with private firms, and those with 
mixed samples.  
_______________________________ 
Please insert Table Two about here 
_______________________________ 
 
Performance Effects for Private Firms  
 
Distinguishing between public and private samples reveals that 
family involvement generally has a positive effect for public firms and 
an insignificant or negative effect for private firms. Only two of the 15 
private sample studies found a positive effect. Kotey (2005) found no 
significant growth effects but positive accounting effects, at certain 
size ranges only. Herrero (2011) found a positive effect for family 
involvement on the size of the catch by fishing boats. Eight of the 15 
private sample studies found an insignificant or mixed effect (Arosa, 
Iturralde & Maseda, 2010; Chrisman, Chua & Litz, 2004, who did find 
evidence of agency advantages; Chrisman, Chua & Kellermanns, 2009; 
Miller, Lee, Chang & Le Breton-Miller, 2009; Molly, Laveren, & Deloof, 
2010; Rutherford et al., 2008; Smith, 2008; Westhead & Cowling, 
1997). Five of the studies found a negative effect (Cucculelli & Micucci, 
2008; Jorissen, Laveren, Martens & Reheul, 2005; Oswald, Muse & 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
Family Business Review, Vol. 25, No. 1 (March 2012): pg. 58-86. DOI. This article is © SAGE Publications and permission 
has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. SAGE Publications does not grant permission 
for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from SAGE 
Publications. 
9 
 
Rutherford, 2009; Sciasci & Mazzola, 2008; and Westhead & Howorth, 
2006). Further, the sophisticated mixed sample study by Bennedsen 
and colleagues (2007), using the random sex of the firstborn as an 
instrument for succession, found significant negative effects of family 
involvement in management. Presumably most firms in their large 
sample were private.4 Overall, the performance of privately held family 
firms does not compare favorably with privately held non-family firms.  
 
Performance Effects for Public Firms  
 
Empirical results are more complex for the 35 studies of 
performance of public family firms. Several studies report non-linear 
effects and other studies report different results depending on the 
level of family involvement. Despite this complexity, the public sample 
studies are less likely to show mixed or non-significant effects. Over 
half of the private sample studies found such results, but only four of 
35 did so in the public samples (Jiang & Peng, 2011; Le Breton-Miller, 
Miller, & Lester 2011; Silva, Majluf & Paredes, 2006; Viviani et al., 
2008). Only four public sample studies found overall negative effects 
for family involvement (Achmad et al, 2009; Miller et al, 2011; 
Sacristán Navarro & Gómez Ansón, 2006; 2011), and four others did 
so under certain circumstances (Bennedsen & Neilsen, 2010; Chahine, 
2007; Le Breton-Miller et al., 2011; Chang et al., 2010). Nine of the 
public sample studies found overall positive effects, and 14 other 
studies found positive effects under certain conditions.5 Almost two 
thirds of these studies found positive effects compared with less than 
one fifth of the private firm samples. Similarly, the meta-analysis of 
studies of public, U.S. family firms by van Essen and colleagues (2010) 
found “modest but statistically significant” positive performance effects 
for family involvement. By contrast, the meta-analysis of studies of 
private firms by Carney and colleagues (2010) found no significant 
performance effects of family involvement.  
 
From these public sample studies we draw two provisional 
conclusions and hence an inference about implications for 
practitioners. First, the performance of public family firms is better 
relative to comparable non-family firms than is the performance of 
private family firms. Second, the public family firms that employ more 
professional practices experience higher performance. Several of these 
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practices relate to ownership concentration and governance. For 
example, negative effects are found for abuse of private information 
(Filatotchev et al., 2011) and for wedges (i.e., discrepancies) between 
cash flow and control rights (Barontini & Caprio, 2006; Claessens, 
Djankov, Fan, & Lang, 2002; Chang et al., 2010). By contrast, positive 
effects are found for professional practices by independent boards 
(Brenes, Madrigal, & Requena, 2011) and for sizeable ownership 
blocks outside the controlling family (Bennedsen & Nielsen, 2010; 
Chahine, 2007; Sacristán Navarro & Gómez Ansón, 2011; Wang et al., 
2010). One study (Tsao et al., 2009) found direct effects of 
professionalizing management practices, in this case by means of high 
performance work systems. Moreover, the contexts within which public 
family firms performed best were the less competitive or turbulent 
environments that could call for sophisticated management (Boubakri, 
Guidhami & Mishra, 2010; Rondøy et al., 2009). Because a firm must 
professionalize to some extent in order to go public, these two 
conclusions lead to the inference that professionalizing improves 
performance.  
 
Limitations of the Performance Studies  
 
Many of the performance studies are carefully crafted and 
cleverly designed. However, they have limitations, many of them 
inevitable in large sample research. We have noted that private and 
non-economic benefits are important in family firms, yet these remain 
largely unobserved. As Filatotchev and colleagues noted, “our 
understanding of specific mechanisms of rent extraction by controlling 
shareholders is limited” (2011, p. 88). This is unsurprising given the 
sensitivity of the question. As a result, researchers have had to resort 
to proxy measures with “inconsistent” methodologies (Astrachan & 
Jaskiewicz, 2008, p. 141; Zellweger & Astrachan, 2008). Similarly, we 
find few observations of how executives manage the interface between 
the familial and business domains, and in particular how they may find 
entrepreneurial opportunities by crossing these domains.  
 
Inadequate data on kinship.  
 
A weakness of many studies of family business is limited 
attention to the familial domain. The performance studies above do 
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not treat kinship as a major independent variable except as a means 
to dichotomize the samples into family and non-family firms. Kinship 
data are limited to a few questions, such as the leaders’ generation 
and the representation of kin in ownership, management or board 
positions. For example, the recent study by Miller and colleagues 
(2011, p. 9) measured kinship ties among board members, managers 
and officers. For a large sample study this is exemplary and represents 
a major effort. Yet even this study overlooks other business-relevant 
variables such as kinship networks beyond the firm (Anderson, Jack, & 
Dodd, 2005), which historical studies have shown to be essential 
instruments of coordination throughout kin groups and across 
corporations (Arrègle, Hitt, Sirmon & Very, 2007; Farrell, 1993, p. 60; 
Ingram & Lifschitz, 2006).  
 
We need more research on “family-related differences [such as] 
variations in inheritance structures or marriage norms” Bertrand and 
Schoar, 2006, p. 94; also Bocatto et al., 2010; Khanna & Yafeh, 
2007). Little attention in performance research has been given to 
influences on family structures such as country histories (Church, 
1993, Colli & Rose, 2003) or societal factors that affect the family 
(Jones, 2005). Examples of such factors are the socialization of 
reproduction (Robertson, 1991, p. 128) and the legal regimes affecting 
family firms. For instance, the “distinction [that] is often made 
between ancestral and self-acquired property” (Goody, 1997, p. 455) 
has implications for power relations and conflicts in Chinese family 
firms (Greenhalgh, 1994; Oxfeld 1993, pp. 191-196). Culture and 
other institutional factors, formal and informal, affect the composition 
of family business and the social networks used by family members 
who are managers (Arrègle, et al, 2007; Arrègle, Batjargal, Hitt, 
Webb, Miller & Tsui, 2010).  
 
With some exceptions (e.g., Jorissen et al., 2005), this research 
pays little attention to individual variables (e.g., human capital) or 
demographic variables (e.g., age, gender), which are important for 
understanding family firms (Bertrand & Schoar, 2006; Danes, Stafford 
& Loy, 2007). Only three of the 59 performance studies (Bennedsen et 
al., 2007; Bertrand, Johnson, Samphantharak & Schoar, 2008; Miller 
et al., 2011) have data on kinship. The family is treated as a “‘black 
box’” (Creed, 2000, p. 346). For example, the data are silent on ties 
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by marriage or blood, or senior and junior lines in a kin group. They 
are silent on properties of the kinship system in question, such as 
norms of inheritance or succession, or the ways that choices are 
possible in the usage or neglect of kinship ties (Stewart, 2010; 
Wallman, 1975).  
 
Dichotomized samples.  
 
With the exception of the study by Le Breton-Miller and 
colleagues (2011), the studies also dichotomize their samples into 
family and non-family firms in various ways, whereas the “degree… 
and mode” of kinship involvement is not “an either-or scenario” 
(Sharma, 2004, p. 4; also Arrègle et al., 2007; Jaskiewicz, González, 
Menéndez, & Schiereck, 2005). Dichotomization is coarse grained, yet 
it is virtually universally practiced. However, as noted, firms are 
affected by kinship to various extents and in various ways. Thus, the 
family business category is far from homogeneous (Croutsche & 
Ganidis, 2008), with variation across many attributes of the business 
and the family, with a “highly skewed distribution” across certain 
measures (Westhead & Cowling, 1997, p. 43). Family firms vary with 
respect to familial character and values, such as the “dynastic motive” 
(Casson, 2000; also Arrègle et al., 2007; Bégin, Chabaud, & 
Richomme-Huet, 2010; Jaskiewicz et al., 2005; Westhead & Howorth, 
2007), for example. They vary with respect to their size and firm 
resources (Herrero, 2011; Kotey, 2005; Sirmon & Hitt, 2003). They 
vary with respect to their financial and competitive strategies (Sirmon, 
Arrègle, Hitt &Webb, 2008; Tsao et al., 2009; van Essen et al., 2010). 
They vary with respect to their approach to involvement (Audretsch, 
Hülsbeck, & Lehmann, 2010; Maury, 2006). They vary across 
industries and sectors (Carr & Bateman, 2010; Casson, 2000). They 
also vary across a wide range of environmental contingencies, such as 
the type of capitalism and the legal context (Carney et al., 2010; 
Steier, 2009).  
 
Dichotomizing the sample into “family” and “non-family” firms 
ignores contingencies that may need to be controlled and focuses 
attention on a potentially spurious category. The “family firm”, as 
opposed to family firms of various types, has not been shown to exist 
as a taxonomic entity (McKelvey, 1982; Stewart & Miner, 2011; 
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Westhead & Howorth, 2007). Less strongly put, the family firm may be 
a formative rather than a reflective construct (Diamantopoulos et al., 
2008) because the dimensions found in some cases (e.g., the dynastic 
motive) are not found in others (Casson, 2000; Croutsche & Ganidis, 
2008; Gilding, 2005).  
 
The consequence of dichotomizing is that whatever factor(s) is 
chosen for the distinction, the split is likely to be arbitrary (Klein, 
Astrachan, & Smyrnios, 2005, p. 321; Rutherford, Kuratko, & Holt, 
2008). As Allouche and colleagues (2008, p. 325) observed about 
performance research, “findings are highly sensitive to the way we 
define family businesses” (also Sacristán Navarro & Gómez Ansón, 
2011). For example, the percentage of family firms in one sample 
ranged from 15% to 81% depending on the definition used (Westhead, 
Cowling & Storey, 2002, p. 23). Thus, the definition selected by the 
research can skew the results.  
 
Failure to Professionalize 
Strong conceptual and empirical arguments favor the 
professionalization of family firms. Nonetheless, as Schulze and 
colleagues (2001, p. 111) observed, not all family firms 
professionalize. For example, some CEOs of successful family firm 
have a low opinion of “professional management” (Gilding, 2005, p. 
36; also Anonymous, 2008; Selekler-Goksen & Öktem, 2009). In 
another example, Yildirim-Öktem and Üsdiken (2010) found that 
Turkish family business groups responded only to coercive pressures 
to professionalize; functionalist and institutional pressures had little 
effect. Why might some family firms be so recalcitrant?  
 
Modes of Professionalization  
 
Part of the answer likely lies in family leaders’ mental model of 
the business. Without a consideration of the family’s “vision”, Chua, 
Chrisman and Sharma (1999) found that the behaviors of family and 
non-family firms could not be distinguished. Similarly, in order to 
understand the mode of professionalization adopted by a family firm, 
we need to consider its leaders’ intentions for their firm, and their 
abilities to envision and to manage a particular mode. With this in 
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mind we have identified six modes of professionalization by family 
firms. These modes are ideal types in a typology derived from the 
literature; they are not an empirical taxonomy (McKelvey, 1982, Chap. 
3). Ordered from the least to the most professionalized (at least in 
their appearance), the modes are:  
 
 firms that lack the capacity for extensive professionalization, 
limited in professionalization on multiple dimensions 
(minimally professional family firms);  
 firms that seek the private benefits of control with their own 
capital, desiring independence from external governance 
(wealth dispensing private family firms);  
 firms that pursue the opportunities found in informal 
operations, limited in the use of formalization and 
standardization (entrepreneurially operated family firms);  
 firms that pursue the opportunities found in networks of 
affiliated firms, remaining embedded in kinship and other 
normative orders (entrepreneurial family business groups);  
 firms that seek the private benefits of control with other 
people’s money, that seek the appearance while violating the 
spirit of public governance (pseudo-professional public family 
firms);  
 professionally managed, family controlled firms, that seek 
the benefits of professionalization while retaining family 
influence (hybrid professional family firms).6  
 
Avoiding overly broad stereotypes.  
 
Family firms tend to make less use than non-family firms of 
“professional HRM practices”, according to de Kok, Uhlaner and Thurik 
(2006, p. 442). These authors suggested two possible reasons: less 
capability, or less need due to lower agency costs. This second 
possibility cautions us against stereotyping family firms as incapable of 
professional management. Cromie, Stephenson and Monteith (1995) 
found that most of the small family firms that they surveyed in Britain 
used elements of professionalization, including formalized, rational 
organizational systems and external sources of expertise. Presumably 
even small, closely held family firms will utilize practices that help their 
business. For example, they may prioritize family members for 
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leadership positions but they cannot indefinitely disregard the principal 
of merit as they assign management roles. (For an example, see Ram, 
1994, pp. 63-70.) Therefore, some elements of professional 
management can likely be found for all family firms.  
 
Moreover, extensive professionalizing might not be needed or 
appropriate. Introducing non-family managers creates the potential for 
conflicts of interest between the owners and their agents, the 
managers; that is, it creates the potential for agency costs (Chua, 
Chrisman, & Bergiel, 2009; Lee, Lim, & Lim, 2003). For example, the 
exploratory study by Chrisman and colleagues (2004) found evidence 
of agency advantages for private family firms relative to non-family 
private firms. Specifically, strategic planning – a staple of professional 
management – was significantly less beneficial for sales growth with 
family firms. Further, the firm’s situation might not require a 
transition. The competitive environment may not require changes if 
the market niches served are small, markets are fragmented, and 
environments dynamic (Casson, 2000; Dyer, 1968; Gedajlovic et al., 
2004). In such cases, the firm is also less likely to experience internal 
pressures for professionalizing in order to deal with increasing scale, 
R&D intensity, or marketing sophistication (Lin & Hu, 2007). Further, 
“cultural and institutional factors” such as the need to professionalize 
to appear legitimate for outsiders might not be salient (Tsui-Auch, 
2004, p. 713). The managerial culture in the broader environment 
might actually be unsympathetic to the transition (Whyte, 1996; 
Zhang & Ma, 2009).  
 
Minimally Professional Family Firms  
 
Many family firms fail to professionalize because they cannot do 
so. They lack the “skills or the will to successfully make the transition 
to professional management” (Sharma, Chrisman & Chua, 1997, p. 
16). Incapacity may result from cognitive, cultural, emotional, or 
managerial barriers. One cognitive impediment is that family business 
managers may not recognize a need for change. Poza, Hanlon and 
Kishida (2004) found that family firm CEOs and parents had a 
significantly higher evaluation of their own management than did other 
family members and non-family managers. Moreover, family member 
CEOs tend to be longer tenured and less well educated than non-
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family CEOs (Bennedsen et al., 2007; Jorissen et al., 2005; Pérez-
González, 2006). The former may believe they are doing all they can 
to keep up with change and could not learn any faster (Zahra & 
Filatotchev, 2004). Therefore, the champions of professionalization 
may be the more educated family leaders. Curiously, Tsui-Auch in his 
(2004) study of professionalization among Chinese family firms in 
Singapore found no correlation with educational levels. Of course, 
these findings may be culturally specific.  
 
Cultural impediments to professionalization include norms of 
kinship systems at odds with economic rationality. A classic problem 
for entrepreneurs wishing to grow their ventures is the challenge of 
“disembedding” (Stewart, 1989, p. 148). Their need to channel 
resources into their venture conflicts with obligations from the webs of 
kinship within which they are embedded. In many cultures, they are 
expected to display their wealth and to redistribute it generously 
amongst their kin. Failure to do so leads to intra-personal and inter-
personal conflicts (Davidoff & Hall, 1987, p. 216; Fletcher, Helienek & 
Zafirova, 2009; Hart, 1975; Watson, 1985, p. 163). Entrepreneurs 
might also seek to exclude family members from responsible positions 
due to their limited capabilities. In most kinship systems they enjoy 
some latitude, but if they prioritize family membership less than is 
normative in their culture, emotionally painful conflict is liable to occur 
(Bertrand & Schoar, 2006; Hamabata, 1990).  
 
Cultural impediments, therefore, are linked with emotional 
impediments. Culture includes expectations about emotions, and as an 
element of culture, so too does a kinship system. Individuals often 
experience ambivalence about feelings that are normative about kin, 
an ambivalence that demonstrates that they have internalized the 
expectations (Peletz, 2001). A common source of ambivalence for 
family business owners is parental recognition that children should 
develop independence, which conflicts with a desire to indulge them. 
Similarly, siblings or cousins might recognize the need to promote the 
most capable offspring but find it hard not to view their own children 
as more capable than their nieces and nephews (Ward, 2004; Tsui-
Auch, 2004). 
The psychological concept for this conundrum is “parental 
altruism” (Lubatkin, Schulze & Ling, 2005). In Japanese culture, a 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
Family Business Review, Vol. 25, No. 1 (March 2012): pg. 58-86. DOI. This article is © SAGE Publications and permission 
has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. SAGE Publications does not grant permission 
for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from SAGE 
Publications. 
17 
 
similar concept that is widely discussed, and seen as endemic in family 
firms, is the indulgence of passive love; in Japanese, amayakasu for 
the giving of indulgence (amae is the noun; Kondo, 1990, p. 150; the 
classic account is Doi, 1973). This problem of indulging family 
members can extend to non-family employees as well as family 
members thanks to ideologies of the workplace as a “family” (Ram & 
Holliday, 1993; Smith, 2009).  
 
Emotional and cultural entanglements such as these make it 
impossible to professionalize a family firm simply by recruiting non-
family managers (Dyer, 1989; for an example see Helin, 2011, pp. 83-
84). The family firm cannot operate just as if it were a non-family firm. 
Being a “professional” manager in the family firm requires the capacity 
to navigate through idiosyncratic family cultures (Hall & Nordqvist, 
2008; Lee, Lim & Lim, 2003; Sacristán Navarro & Gómez Ansón, 
2009). For family members to be accepted as professionals, they for 
their part may need the “social skills to be accepted among other 
employees” (Helin, 2011, p. 159; also 108).  
 
For many reasons, family firms can find it difficult to attract, 
reward and retain high quality “professional” managers (Barnett & 
Kellermanns, 2006; Beehr, Drexler, & Faulkner, S., 1997; Stewart, 
2003). Professionalizing HRM practices in the family firm requires 
consideration of factors that militate against shorter-term or stock-
based incentives: the firm’s non-economic goals, longer time horizons 
and the desire to maintain control for the generations (Chua, 
Chrisman, & Bergiel, 2009; Gedajlovic et al., 2004). Meritocracy mixed 
with preferential access for kin leads to ambiguities for all concerned 
(Helin, 2011, pp. 155-156). Efforts to import HRM practices without 
consideration of the family context generate conflict (Bertrand & 
Schoar, 2006; Hall & Nordqvist, 2008). Similarly, pay dispersion in the 
top management team correlates with significantly higher growth in 
non-family firms but significantly lower growth in family firms (Ensley, 
Pearson, & Sardeshmukh, 2007; also Schulze et al., 2001). Of course, 
minimal professionalization may simply be due to an inability to pay 
market wages (Carrasco-Hernandez & Sánchez-Marin, 2007; Cater & 
Schwab, 2008; McConaughy, 2000).  
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Wealth Dispensing Private Family Firms  
 
Some family firms are able to recruit and reward non-family 
executives, to go public and gain external equity, or both of these 
options, and consequently seize growth opportunities. However, their 
leaders might have little enthusiasm for independent boards and other 
governance features of professional public firms. They might view 
these external responsibilities as a threat to their benefits: privacy, 
valuation placed on non-economic benefits, and privileged access to 
resources found uniquely in the kinship domain (Lomnitz & Pérez-
Lizaur, 1987, pp. 105, 116-117). For example, they enjoy greater 
influence than CEOs of widely held firms in the use of discretionary 
cash flows (Muntean, 2009).  
 
Most of these perquisites also apply to other closely held, 
private firms and do not explain the lower accounting and operating 
performances of family firms (Zellweger & Nason, 2008). The same 
desire to reduce taxes and hence reported income applies equally to 
their comparison firms. The private benefits available to owners may, 
however, be especially pervasive in family firms. Among all types of 
owners, family owners have more “ways to divert benefits to 
themselves compared with managers at” “widely held corporations” 
(Claessens et al., 2002, p. 2744). Further, private perquisites, such as 
non-arms length transactions and asset acquisitions, serve the 
interests not only of the owner but also those of his or her kinship 
group and their “lifestyle” (Westhead & Cowling, 1997, p. 46). Such 
transfer of wealth from the firm to the owners’ coffers may be more 
prevalent in family-controlled than in other closely held firms 
(Bennedsen & Nielsen, 2010; Bertrand & Schoar, 2006). Therefore, 
the apparently lower performance of family firms might not be 
perceived as such by these CEOs (Pérez-González, 2006; Poza et al., 
2004).  
 
Family firm CEOs might also have more non-economic 
preferences than non-family firm CEOs (Astrachan & Jaskiewicz, 2008; 
Chrisman et al., 2010). They might prefer, as Gómez-Mejía and 
colleagues (2007) suggest, to preserve their “socioeconomic wealth” 
rather than to maximize their financial wealth. In the CEO’s eyes, this 
non-financial wealth might include their capacity for providing 
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employment for relatives or for maintaining a long-standing company 
name that provides prestige to the family (Berghoff, 2006; Erhardt, 
Nowak, & Weber, 2005; Lomnitz & Pérez-Lizaur, 1987, pp. 13, 105; 
116-117; Thomas, 2009; Zellweger & Astrachan, 2008).  
 
From the viewpoint of entrenched family CEOs, professionalizing 
management may be a threat to their power, especially if these CEOs 
are, as often, less well educated than their peers (Zahra & Filatotchev, 
2004). It could be a threat to their unique access to familial resources 
(Athananssiou et al., 2002; Colli et al., 2003). In Greenhalgh’s (1994, 
p. 751) depiction of a Taiwanese “family head,” manipulation of 
kinship traditions enabled him to “build his firm out of the loyalties and 
talents of his family.” Therefore, entrenched leaders of family firms 
may choose to retain their “traditional” methods, particularly in 
functions related to privileged control over resources such as cash 
flows and executive positions. We could expect that the most likely 
areas of conflict in efforts to professionalize are financial and HR 
strategy, and governance. However, for obvious reasons these 
conflict-laden topics are difficult to study.  
 
Principal-principal conflicts in private family firms. Leaders of 
privately held family firms, certainly those that are closely held, enjoy 
legitimate discretion over the dispensation of the wealth of their firms. 
However, minority shareholders, if they exist, may be disadvantaged 
by the lack of liquidity of the shares and hence a weak negotiating 
position at times of ownership consolidation. Therefore, “principal-
principal” conflicts can arise with the majority owners, a type of 
conflict that is more widely recognized in public family firms (e.g., Luo, 
Wan, & Cai, 2011; Morck & Yeung, 2003; Yoshikawa & Rasheed, 
2010).  
 
Less recognized is the potential for another form of principal-
principal conflict that arises in closely held, private family firms.7 
Provided that private family firms generate wealth, decisions must be 
made about which private benefits will be dispensed and to whom. 
Within the family there can be cleavages between active and passive 
owners, generating differing interests in reinvestments versus 
dividends. There can be differing treatments of males and females, in-
laws compared with agnates (“blood” relatives), or of different 
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branches of the family (Bertrand et al., 2008). The consequences 
extend beyond negative affect to include the expropriation of 
resources for one family member at the expense of other relatives and 
of the performance of the firm (Bertrand et al., 2008). From the 
perspective of insiders to the family group, any such cleavages and 
differentiations in benefits will be highly visible. For example, the 
family cannot hide who gets to live in the ancestral villa (see Helin, 
2011, pp. 111, 136-139).  
 
Intra-familial conflicts are notoriously common. For example, 
conflicts among siblings are noted in trade books (e.g., Paisner, 1999), 
in textbooks (e.g., Poza, 2004), in biographies (e.g., Smit, 2008), and 
in scholarly monographs (e.g., Watson, 1985). Although they are 
typically hidden from outsiders, intra-familial principal-principal 
conflicts in private family firms may be more widespread than 
ownership-based principal-principal conflicts in public family firms. 
They can prove a threat to firm survival if, as Bertrand and colleagues 
observed (2008, p. 467), they precipitate “a ‘race to the bottom’ 
where one brother [successor] tries to tunnel resources out of the firm 
before another brother does.”  
 
From the viewpoint of non-family employees and of family 
members who are younger, female, from lesser branches of the family, 
or skeptical about the family ideology, professionalization could seem 
an opportunity not a threat. These actors could approve of professional 
management as a means to value openness and disclosure in contrast 
with reticence and secrecy (Gedajlovic et al., 2004; Greenhalgh, 1994; 
Stewart, 2003). Their enthusiasm could itself be threatening to 
entrenched leaders. As these examples suggest, non-economic 
benefits may co-exist with non-financial costs such as “role conflicts 
and social constraints” (Zellweger & Astrachan, 2008, p. 348). Hence, 
performance studies that rely on “externally derived” dependent 
variables may fail to measure the costs and benefits to family 
involvement that are important in the family’s decisions to maintain or 
to give up control (Astrachan, 2010, p. 10; Astrachan & Jaskiewicz, 
2008).  
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Entrepreneurially Operated Family Firms  
 
Some family firms are better served by entrepreneurial rather 
than professional management. Performance studies provide support 
for this rationale. Market results for founder-CEO led firms are 
significantly superior to those for successor-CEO led firms, whether or 
not the successors are scions of the family (Fahlenbrach, 2009; 
Nelson, 2003). Several studies find this effect with family successors. 
Among the studies in Table Two, several distinguish between the 
founding generation and succeeding heirs, with the former 
outperforming the latter. Lower performance for heirs than for non-
descendents or founders was found in several public sample studies 
(Anderson, Mansi & Reeb, 2003; Andres, 2008; Morck, Strangeland & 
Yeung, 2000; Pérez-González, 2006; Saito, 2008; Villalonga & Amit, 
2006). This generational effect has been found as well in mixed 
samples (Barth, Gulbrandsen, & Schøne, 2005; Bennedsen et al., 
2007) and in private samples (Barontini & Caprio, 2006; Erhardt et al., 
2005; Saito, 2008). The meta-analysis by van Essen, Carney, 
Gedajlovic and van Oosterhout (2010) attributed this generational 
effect to the fact that successive generations are more risk averse. 
Perhaps they are trying to preserve wealth rather than to create new 
wealth as the founders tried to do.  
 
Several authors have therefore suggested that the superior 
performance for public family firms is due to entrepreneurial effects 
and not family effects (Arrègle & Mari, 2010; Casson, 2000, pp. 205-
206). For example, Fogel (2006) and Saito (2008) argued that the 
positive effects found may be driven by founders who are, after all, 
unusually successful having taken their businesses public. In a 
complementary study of Fortune 1000 firms, Miller and colleagues 
(2011) distinguished among family firms, family founders, and lone 
founders, concluding that “lone founder firms” were most inclined to 
growth strategies and were best at providing returns to the owners. 
Another indication of an entrepreneurial, rather than family, effect is 
Chu’s (2011) finding of superior performance only for smaller public 
family firms.  
 
Professional versus entrepreneurial management. Some types of 
“professionalizing” may not be appropriate for entrepreneurial family 
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firms. We refer to professionalizing in the sense of “formalized, 
standardized, and… scientific” means of functioning (Zhang and Ma, 
2009, p. 133; also Hwang & Powell, 2009). Entrepreneurial 
management can be superior, given certain contingencies, and this 
superiority can be augmented by the familial context. There are four 
reasons supporting this argument. The first is that entrepreneurial 
management may be superior because informal social ties enhance the 
coordination and knowledge sharing internal to a company. When the 
members of a firm understand one another as members of a kin group 
commonly do, they become adept at the “mutual accommodation” 
(Burns & Stalker, 1966) that facilitates adaptation to change. By 
contrast, salaried managers are inclined to replace these informal 
understandings with formal systems of command and control, referred 
to as “Generally Accepted Management Principles (GAMP)” by the field 
researcher Leonard Sayles (1993, p. 25-26). Observational studies 
over several decades have shown that this abstract approach 
frequently fails the coordination challenges whereas “work flow 
entrepreneurship” by lower-level employees often succeeds (Sayles & 
Stewart, 1995; Smith, 2009, pp. 81-86).  
 
Second, informal and idiosyncratic methods may be superior to 
formalization, standardization and cosmopolitan education, not only 
because of the need for ongoing coordination but also because of the 
emergence of these methods from practice, not universal principles. As 
Sarasvathy (2001) argued, skilled entrepreneurs construct 
opportunities out of available resources, rather than plan for pre-
determined goals. Bricolage of this sort is best achieved with firm-
specific knowledge and experience and “training [that] is idiosyncratic 
to the particular work” (Dyer, 1989, p. 224). This knowledge is often 
tacit and team-based, rather than explicit or individual (Lave & 
Wenger, 1991), and may be better developed with the long-term 
relationships found both in kinship and in family business (Bloch, 
1973; Ellis, 2011; Habbershon, 2006). As a result, the informal 
methods of entrepreneurial employees can outperform the more 
formal methods of approved professional practice (Ram, 1994, pp. 60-
61; Stewart, 1989, Chap. 3).  
 
The cognitive processes developed informally on the job can 
also be better suited than formal processes for coping with unexpected 
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changes (Starbuck, 2009). As Gedajlovic and colleagues (2011, p. 10) 
argued, family firm executives can operate with the discretion derived 
from “greater scope for the use of entrepreneurial cognitions, which 
rely on heuristics and simplified decision rules that enable timely 
strategic decisions.” This is a third reason that family firms may 
benefit from using entrepreneurial rather than a professional approach 
to management.  
 
The domains of kinship and business. A fourth reason that 
entrepreneurial management can be superior is that family firms offer 
unique opportunities for entrepreneurial behavior. Johannisson (2002) 
has proposed that entrepreneurial potential is found at the interfaces 
of family and business. Following the terminology of the kinship 
theorist Meyer Fortes (1969), kinship and commerce are among the 
major social “domains” in society (for qualifications of this language 
see Jones, 2005; and Stewart & Hitt, 2010). These domains intersect 
in complex ways, but one of Fortes’ arguments was that they are not 
reducible one to the other (Stewart & Miner, 2011). Rather, the 
domains of business and kinship are commonly regarded as “very 
different in their essence” (De Lima, 2000, p. 152). In many cultures, 
kinship is at the least a widely adopted idiom that reflects the deepest 
moral values of the culture (Bloch, 1973; Peletz 2001; Song, 1999, pp. 
82-83; Steadman, Palmer & Tilley, 1996; Stewart, 1989, Chap. 8).  
 
Haynes, Onochie and Muske (2007, pp. 408, 395) found a 
demonstration of this distinction between domains. They observed that 
among members of U.S. family firms, “positive changes in the 
business financial indicators create a positive perception of the 
business, however they have no influence on the family’s perception[s] 
of a better quality of life” or “of the family’s success”. Another 
demonstration, from the ethnographic record, illustrates a common 
conundrum for families with businesses (Ram & Holliday, 1993). 
Hamabata (1990, p. 43) described a young man who was, in the 
domestic domain, a “pet” child, but was in the commercial domain 
recognized to be an incompetent successor. This is an example in 
which the mixing of domains represents a cost born by the business. 
Managing a family firm includes at its heart an effort to reconcile 
differences among the domains (Arrègle et al., 2007; Colli, 2003, p. 
67; Jones, 2005; Sharma, 2004; Stewart, 2003).  
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The boundaries of family and business as entrepreneurial 
opportunity. Johannisson studied 24 family firms over 15 years and 
found that the most successful among them did not adopt 
“managerialism”, nor did they acquire external equity investments. 
Rather, they used the “friction energy” and the “interplay” among 
“entrepreneurship as a passion for change, the family as a social 
institution, and management as a profession [to] energize the 
medium-sized family business” (pp. 46, 48, 50). Scholes and 
colleagues (2011) offered a complementary argument about the 
entrepreneurial potential of combining family and business. Whereas 
Johannisson emphasized the creative potential raised by differences in 
ideologies, they emphasized complementarity as a key to 
innovativeness. “This complementarity emerges through a process of 
negotiating shared values achieved, for example, by enabling a non-
family manager to act as a mentor/adviser to existing family 
managers” (Scholes et al., 2011).  
 
Stewart and Hitt (2010) explained the entrepreneurial potential 
of family and business in terms of the logic of Barth’s (1967) thesis on 
the bridging of different spheres of exchange. Insofar as the domains 
of family and business are in practice distinct, a classic entrepreneurial 
opportunity arises because the same resources, such as personal 
networks or potential employees, are discrepantly valued based on 
different uses or functions in one domain versus in the other. As Barth 
argued in his seminal paper, “entrepreneurs will direct their activity 
pre-eminently towards those points of an economic system where the 
discrepancies of evaluation are the greatest, and will attempt to create 
bridging transactions” (Barth, 1967, p. 171; Stewart, 1989, Chap. 8; 
2003). Discrepancies in evaluation can arise because of constraints on 
exchange – in an obvious example, familial love is not widely regarded 
as saleable. They can also arise simply from differing perspectives. For 
example, impecunious noble families may enter into marital exchanges 
with the newly wealthy, trading prestige for commercial opportunities 
or capital, and vice versa (McDonogh, 1986, Chap. One).  
 
In family businesses, an entrepreneurial opportunity arises 
when something, such as a custom or set of relationships, from the 
business domain has a use that renders it more valuable in the family 
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domain. The reverse also applies. An example of higher valuation in 
the kinship domain than in the business domain is a managerial 
position for an unemployed relative. Another example is a modestly 
profitable venture that, while unappealing in financial terms, serves as 
a means of reuniting scattered kin by attracting them to its 
employment (Bruun, 1993, p. 32; Greenhalgh, 1994).  
 
Examples of higher valuations in the business domain than in 
the kinship domain are secrecy and trust (Landes, 2006, p. 292; 
Lomnitz & Pérez-Lizaur, 1987, pp. 119, 123). In business, the ability 
to maintain a confidence for many years can be invaluable (Benedict, 
1968; Marcus & Hall, 1992, Chap. 4). Such discretion is useful with 
clandestine familial arrangements but materially more useful with 
clandestine boardroom agreements. It will therefore be particularly 
valuable in contexts in which trust is at a premium, such as less 
developed countries. For example, Ram noted the positive value in the 
business domain of their owners’ familial reputation, spousal 
monitoring of labor, and frugality in disposition of corporate assets 
(1994, pp. 60, 81, 103, 108). However, he emphasized the indulgence 
of incompetent kin who had an undue sense of entitlement (pp. 63-72, 
107). This example demonstrates that negative transfers can also 
occur.  
 
Entrepreneurial Family Business Groups 
In contexts of poor securities law (such that owners risk 
expropriation by other owners) and poor commercial law (such that 
transactions between businesses are risky), market arrangements are 
substituted by networks of jointly owned and kinship-connected firms. 
These family business groups gain “access to nonmarketed inputs” 
(Leff, 1978, p. 668) and perform a market creating or input 
completing function (Gilson, 2007; Silva et al., 2006; Young et al., 
2008). This function has been construed as a form of entrepreneurship 
(Leff, 1978; Leibenstein, 1968). We can also construe it as a form of 
Barthian entrepreneurship (Barth, 1965). As Leff (1978, p. 668) noted, 
“honesty and trustworthy competence” may be a rare input in less 
developed marketplaces, such that information about sources is more 
freely available in the kinship arena than the commercial arena. As an 
example of the effectiveness of this mode, Hsieh, Yeh and Chen 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
Family Business Review, Vol. 25, No. 1 (March 2012): pg. 58-86. DOI. This article is © SAGE Publications and permission 
has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. SAGE Publications does not grant permission 
for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from SAGE 
Publications. 
26 
 
(2010) found that among Taiwanese electronics firms, those that are 
affiliated with business groups out-innovate those that are not.8  
 
Family business groups are the dominant form of medium- to 
large-scale businesses worldwide (Bertrand et al., 2008; Morck, 
Wolfenzon & Yeung, 2005; Young et al., 2008). However, familial ties 
are not the only possible basis for inter-firm trust. Other types of 
informal social ties can enhance the coordination, “knowledge sharing 
and collusion” among firms in the same industry (Ingram & Lifschitz, 
2006, p. 335). Besides kinship ties, other possibilities include ethnicity, 
religion, and caste. It seems possible that firms relatively highly 
embedded in kinship (Aldrich and Cliff, 2003) are also predisposed to 
these other forms of embeddedness (Colli & Rose, 2003; Janjuha-
Jivraj & Woods, 2002; Peredo, 2003). All of these can be the basis for 
what Cohen (1969) called “informal interest groups”. Examples of 
these where benefits to business have been substantial include the 
West Highlands Asian clothing industry (Ram, 1994); fashion shoes 
(Blim, 1990), long distance trade (Cohen, 1969), ship building (Ingram 
& Lifschitz, 2006), and textiles (Farrell, 1993); for an example of early 
positive and later negative effects see Karra, Tracey and Phillips 
(2006).  
 
Why kinship? Other bases of embeddedness can substitute for 
kinship, but kinship is ubiquitous whereas the other bases are 
historically contingent. Why might this be so? Marcus and Hall (1992) 
offered one possible answer. They argued that kinship networks have 
a unique capacity to provide linkages, “to make secret deals, … to pull 
together resources from across various social and institutional spheres 
to pursue a single aim… [because] they integrate functions and 
activities that specialized institutional orders differentiate and 
fragment (p. 131).” For example, for families that own small 
businesses, kinship is the source of the “synthesis” needed to patch 
together “multiple incomes, from multiple sources, with multiple 
fallback positions” (Creed, 2000, p. 343).  
 
Gilson (2007) proposed another possible answer. The basis of 
his argument is that outsiders need to evaluate not only the 
trustworthiness of a (theoretically) immortal firm, but also the 
interests of (mortal) executives who could choose actions harmful to 
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the long-run reputation of the firm, but lucrative for themselves in the 
shorter run. He argued that “when the corporation is owned by a 
family, the internal incentives become much more transparent” (2007, 
p. 643). This argument is limited by the problem (which he notes) that 
the cross-generational unity of interests cannot be taken for granted 
and is difficult to evaluate from outside. Perhaps a solution to this 
problem may be found in Leff’s foundational article. Leff (1978) noted 
that family business groups tend to be multi-family groups, with 
extensive ties of inter-marriage, ritual kinship, and apprenticeship 
exchanges among successors (Chung & Luo, 2008; Grassby, 2001, pp, 
279-283; Ingram & Lifschitz, 2006; Kuper, 2009). The tendency for 
family groups to link multiple families is variable cross-culturally (for 
its absence in Pakistan see Papanek, 1973), and might be a factor in 
relative economic development. Similarly, the relative performance of 
family groups varies across countries (Morck et al., 2005).  
 
Pseudo-Professional Public Family Firms  
 
Family groups offer “particularly rich possibilities for 
expropriation” of minority owners (Faccio, Lang, & Young, 2001, p. 
55). As with other family firms, they can use mechanisms such as 
excess compensation of family members (Barontini & Bozzi, 2011; 
Chourou, 2010). Their structure makes them amenable to “transfer 
pricing [manipulation and] related-party transactions” (Luo et al., 
2011, 2nd page; also Jiang & Peng, 2011; Morck et al., 2005). This 
“tunneling” of value is especially a problem when there are wedges 
between cash flow and control rights. For example, Silva and 
colleagues (2006) found that in family groups with balanced ownership 
and control, familial ties among affiliates increase stock market value 
(with value creation the dominant effect), whereas with an excess of 
control over ownership, market value is harmed (with value 
expropriation the dominant effect).  
 
We have observed that such expropriation of resources by 
controlling owners at the expense of other family members can occur 
within privately held family firms (Bertrand et al., 2008). When this 
behavior occurs in public family firms it compounds these intra-familial 
principal-principal conflicts with majority-minority owner principal-
principal conflicts (Jiang & Peng, 2011; Young et al., 2008). It thereby 
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violates several principles of professional governance, not to mention 
the responsibility of professionals to act with integrity.  
 
Scholars in economics and finance have studied these 
governance failings, expropriation from minority owners, and the 
ensuing inefficiencies in resource allocation (e.g., Faccio et al., 2001; 
Morck & Steier, 2007). For example, Morck and colleagues (2005, p. 
676) noted that a divergence between cash flow and control rights, 
which is typically caused by pyramidal structures or dual-class shares,  
 
“can lead to inefficient investment… This is because the 
controlling family earns only a small part, corresponding to its 
small cash flow rights in such a firm, of any investment’s 
monetary payoff but can retain all of any private benefits the 
investment generates.”  
 
These sorts of inefficiencies have consequences for pseudo-
professional firms themselves, for other modes of family firms, and for 
entrepreneurial activity.  
 
Poor governance as a response to poor legal protections 
becomes self-reinforcing. Given strong legal protections, as in Japan 
and the United States, minority owners appear not to be expropriated 
(Anderson & Reeb, 2003b; Chen, Chen, Cheng & Shevlin, 2010; 
Yoshikawa & Rasheed, 2010). Absent these protections, the main 
defense of an owner against expropriation by another is holding a 
major ownership block. This defense carries attendant costs in lower 
diversification and liquidity and higher monitoring requirements, which 
in turn are compensated by expropriation, which further reinforces the 
systemic need to protect against expropriation by means of holding a 
controlling stake (Luo et al., 2011).  
 
Monitoring costs to protect against such behavior are high, 
because those firms that seek the private benefits of control with other 
people’s money – that is, with public equity (Morck et al., 2005; Yeung 
& Soh, 2000) – take pains to appear to be professionally managed and 
governed. “In essence, these firms attempt to appear as having 
‘crossed the threshold’ from founder control to professional 
management… [their] corporate governance structures… often 
resemble those of [professional firms] in form but not in substance” 
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(Young et al., 2008, pp. 198-199). Such a pretense intensifies the 
vicious cycle of mistrust found in low investor protection environments. 
Because of the difficulties investors face in seeing beyond pseudo-
professional facades, public family firms provide signals of their good 
faith regarding minority owners. These signals have costs, both for the 
firms that make them and for the economy as a whole. 
Signaling good faith. Publicly traded family firms can signal their 
good faith and gain legitimacy by hiring the major international 
accounting firms (Yeung & Soh, 2000). Another way, which has also 
been found in the high investor protection environment of the U.S., is 
restraining from tax aggressiveness (i.e., “the downward management 
of taxable income… [and] tax avoidance”, Chen et al., 2010, pp. 41-
42). Chen and colleagues (2010) found that family controlled firms are 
less tax aggressive than non-family controlled firms. They argued that 
this behavior signals good faith to minority shareholders because “tax 
aggressiveness activities are often bundled with rent extraction” (p. 
60).  
 
Two other signals have the effect of reducing the cash flows at 
the discretion of the owners: increased levels of debt (Setia-Atmaja, 
Tanewski & Skully, 2009) and higher dividend payments (Faccio et al., 
2001; Setia-Atmaja, Tanewski & Skully, 2009; Young et al., 2008). In 
the low investor protection environment of China, families with excess 
control over ownership are less inclined to pay dividends, but high 
growth family firms, which should be reinvesting cash flows, pay even 
higher dividends, in order to attact capital (Feng, 2011). By contrast, 
Japanese family firms pay higher dividends than non-family firms, but 
do not do so if they are quickly growing (Yoshikawa & Rasheed, 2010). 
In high investor protection environments, low dividend payments can 
be interpreted as a signal of stewardship (Le Breton-Miller et al., 
2011). In environments where, instead, fast growing firms pay 
dividends as signals to investors who could invest simply on the basis 
of growth expectations, damage is done to resource allocation and 
economic growth, and not just to the firms compelled to dispense with 
scarce resources.9  
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Hybrid Professional Family Firms  
 
The hunt for the Heffalump. The hybrid professional family firm 
is like the Heffalump: “a rather large and very important animal” that 
scholars have not yet trapped and depicted (Kilby, 1971, p. 1). Two 
questions are particularly vexing: (1) what is it, exactly, or otherwise 
phrased, how can it be achieved? And, (2) how well does it perform? 
Does it attain the twin advantages of professionalism and family 
involvement, thereby out-performing non-family professional firms? 
The last question is the easier entry point to the Heffalump hunter’s 
conundrum.  
 
Referring to the performance studies (Table Two), the answer 
would seem to be no: professional family firms perform the same as 
other professional firms. This inference follows if we compare family 
and non-family public firms that no longer are managed by founders. 
For these firms there are no significant performance differences. All 
performance advantages for public family firms can be attributed to 
first-generational, entrepreneurial effects (Arrègle & Mari, 2010; Chu, 
2011; Fogel, 2006; Saito, 2008). This answer of average performance 
has face validity. If a family firm thoroughly professionalizes, it 
conforms to the normative modes of organization and management. 
Its performance can be expected to be average.  
 
However, we also know that family firms are better than non-
family firms at expropriating value and enjoying the private benefits of 
control (Bennedsen & Nielsen, 2010; Bertrand & Schoar, 2006; 
Claessens et al., 2002; Westhead & Cowling, 1997). Therefore, if at 
least some public family firms share this tendency, the apparently 
equal performance, net of value expropriation, may not reflect equal 
performance in value creation. Further, there are large sample and 
case research reasons to think that this may be so. These arguments 
will also lead us back to the first question, what is a professional family 
firm?  
 
Family control: enough but not too much. There may be an 
optimal level of family involvement in ownership and involvement in 
management: not too little and not too much. For example, Sirmon 
and colleagues (2008) argued that family-influenced but not family-
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controlled firms, optimally holding about 15% of the equity, tended to 
achieve more positive outcomes. For these firms, the positive 
attributes of a family are enabled while the potential negative effects 
of family involvement are limited. They further argued that 
maintaining the family influence was important but giving some voice 
to other stakeholders disallows the negative attributes of family control 
on the business. They also found that firms having family influence are 
more likely to respond with higher investments in R&D and with 
internationalization than nonfamily firms or family controlled firms.  
 
By contrast, Le Breton-Miller and colleagues (2011) found that 
most of their indicators of family involvement are significantly 
associated with lower stewardship and hence lower stock market 
performance, whereas high levels of family ownership lead to higher 
levels of stewardship. “Family control bears a curvilinear U-shaped 
relationship with stewardship” with the relationship turning positive 
around “a 28% [ownership] inflection point” (2011, p. 715). They 
attributed this finding to an increasing identification between the 
family’s interests and those of the firm. These two studies differed in 
the outcomes they examined (strategic actions versus stewardship) 
and are not fully comparable. Therefore, we cannot say exactly where 
to find this golden mean of family influence, but both studies are 
suggestive of a hybrid possibility.  
 
Hatum and colleagues (2010) reported a more detailed but 
small-n study. They compared two Argentine family-owned food 
processors. One firm proved much more adaptive to environmental 
shifts. This firm was less bureaucratic, centralized and formalized than 
the other, especially in operations, although it incorporated elements 
of formalization and strategic analysis. Unlike the less adaptive firm, it 
recruited senior managers with diverse experiences and perspectives 
as well as promoting from within. It celebrated its tradition of 
innovation and appears to have succeeded in finding salaried 
managers who had a cultural fit with the family (Hall & Nordqvist, 
2008). This adaptive family firm exemplifies some of the possible 
means by which such firms can successfully professionalize.  
 
As Dyer (1989) observed, firms can professionalize their 
managerial staff either by hiring established managers or by 
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developing their current or potential managers. Further research is 
warranted to identify the contexts and approaches in which family and 
business interests can jointly be served. However, we can find in the 
literature some suggestions. Large family owned firms that succeed 
over the generations appear to use both approaches (Benedict, 1968; 
de Lima, 2000; Tsui-Auch, 2004). Their founding families retain a 
sense of their tradition and purpose, but they may also display a 
“market mentality” (Steier, 2003) that enables them to take an 
“active” ownership role (Helin, 2011). Here, we must recognize that 
our suggestions are speculative as there is still a great deal to learn 
(Schulze & Gedajlovic, 2010; Steier, 2003).  
 
Conclusion: Looking Back and Looking Forward  
 
Research on professionalization.  
 
Although “professionalization” is often treated as a singular 
construct, it entails multiple dimensions (Table One) that combine in 
different ways in various modes among family firms. A comprehensive 
understanding of these combinations would require attention to six 
distinct categories of variables. These categories are (1) the 
environment, such as national legal development and intensity of 
competition (Tsui-Auch, 2004; Zhang & Ma, 2009); (2) family 
characteristics, such as generation and family orientation (Bennedsen 
et al., 2007; Lumpkin, Martin & Vaughan, 2008) (3) business 
characteristics, such as firm size and governance (Kotey, 2005; 
Chrisman, Chua & Kellermanns, 2009); (4) managerial approach, such 
as the use of internally or externally developed knowledge and the 
principle of merit (Ram, 1994; Oxfeld, 1993, p. 164-166, 191-196); 
(5) performance outcomes, such as financial market measures and 
non-economic benefits (Miller et al., 2011; Chrisman et al., 2010); and 
(6) effects for various stakeholders, such as minority shareholders and 
non-family managers (Martínez et al., 2007; Barnett & Kellermanns, 
2006).  
 
Given such complexity, it is unsurprising that there are gaps in 
our knowledge about the modes of professional management in family 
firms. This is borne out by a review of the 12 studies we found that 
directly bear on this topic. None employ fine-grained data on kinship 
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(Parada et al, 2010 and Tsui-Auch, 2004 are partial exceptions). None 
depict managerial processes as they relate to the use of kinship. Most 
construe professionalization in terms of the employment of non-family 
managers, which is typically held to stand for broader changes. At 
most, four dimensions are considered (Hung & Whittington, 2011; 
Songini & Gnan, 2009). The processes of professionalization receive 
welcome attention in some of the articles, all of them qualitative, 
(Chittoor & Das, 2007; Dyer, 1989; Hall & Nordqvist, 2008; Hung & 
Whittington, 2011; Parada et al., 2010; Tsui-Auch, 2004).  
 
Salaried managers in a family firm must attend to the needs of 
the families owning the firm (Colli et al., 2003; Hall & Nordqvist, 2008; 
Morck & Steier, 2007) and several observers have proposed that 
“professional” management in such firms is distinctive (Astrachan, 
2010; Dyer, 1989; Hall & Nordqvist, 2008; Sacristán Navarro & Gómez 
Ansón, 2009). Unfortunately, direct evidence about such management 
is rare. Empirical evidence on the benefits of professionalizing is also 
rare. Arguments in its favor tend to be inferences drawn from the 
process of going public (Rondøy, Dibrell, & Craig, 2009; Schulze et al., 
2001) or broad-brush historical patterns, such as the relative decline 
of British industry (Chandler, 1990; we have noted that several 
business historians no longer endorse this view; e.g., Colli et al., 
2003; Landes, 2006). Moreover, the evidence favoring “professional” 
management in growing ventures is weak. Growth is one of the 
purported benefits of professionalization (Casson, 2000; Chandler, 
1990, p. 390). However, Willard, Krueger and Feeser (1992) did not 
find evidence that professionally managed high growth ventures 
outperformed founder-managed high growth ventures.  
 
Possibly, then, we should not search for a distinctive 
“professional” quality in entrepreneurial family firms but for a quality 
not yet named. As Gartner has recently argued (2011, p. 14), “new 
words are needed to broaden our vocabulary about what 
entrepreneurship is, and might be.” The managerial and familial 
processes by which family firms can achieve their optimal mix require 
fine-grained research to identify and understand them. Little research 
has been reported on managerial approaches to achieve synergies 
between family and business. Most empirical studies comparing family 
and non-family businesses have entailed coarse-grained 
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methodologies (common in the early development of a field) and have 
not considered the host of capabilities, motivations and goals that 
energize both the family and the business. Nor have they adequately 
addressed the complexities of the relationships between the family and 
the firm (Nordqvist & Melin, 2010; Rogoff & Heck, 2003; Steier, 2007; 
Stewart, 2008). Therefore, we encourage researchers to delve deeply 
into both, their dynamics and inter-connections, using finer-grained 
methodologies, quantitative or qualitative.  
 
Adapting the title of an older article (Gerson, 1989), data are 
expensive, models are cheap. Many of the limitations in knowledge 
that we have observed can be attributed to data limitations. Because 
professionalization is a multidimensional process with differing modes, 
further progress will require fine-grained data in multiple areas:  
 
 the range of ways that business can be embedded in society 
with attention to the links between kinship and other modes 
(e.g., ethnicity)  
 the full range of kinship entanglements with business, including 
kinship networks, quasi-kin, women’s roles, family friends etc. 
the processes of creating synergies and avoiding diseconomies 
at the interface of kinship and business  
 non-economic and private benefits and purposes  
 the processes of professionalization, including data on the 
environment, managerial character, subjective and objective 
outcomes, and stakeholder implications  
 
Contributions can be made with a host of research methods. 
Scholars who are adept at large sample quantitative research can 
augment archival data on public firms with other documentary 
evidence, similar to Bennedsen and colleagues (2007). Others can 
develop representative surveys of private firms, as did Winter and 
colleagues (1998). Historians can lend their particular expertise, as did 
Farrell (1993). So too can ethnographers and other qualitative field 
researchers, as did Ram (1994). In fact, scholars have contributed in 
all of these ways. We urge them to continue and hope that we have 
encouraged their endeavors. The family business field is vitally 
important in practice. Contrary to Professor Higgins’ or any others’ 
stereotyping, family businesses are neither “lags” nor are they just 
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one type of enterprise. Rather, they represent a diverse, fertile and 
challenging ground for scholarly exploration. 
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4 The sample for Bennedsen and colleagues (2007) is mixed but must 
presumably be primarily private, considering the large number of firms 
(5,334 that experienced a succession) within a small country 
(Denmark). The sample for Minichilli, Corbetta and MacMillan is 73% 
private (67/92). The sample used by Audretsch, Hülsbeck, and 
Lehmann includes private firms but all have the supervisory and 
management boards required of public firms in Germany.  
5 Positive effects overall: Allouche et al., 2008; Anderson & Reeb, 2003a; 
Bonilla et al., 2010; Chu, 2009; Lee, 2006; Martínez et al., 2007; 
McConaughy et al., 2001; Poutziouris, 2006; Trebucq, 2002; positive 
under certain conditions: Anderson et al., 2003; Andres, 2008; 
Barontini & Caprio, 2006; Boubakri et al., 2010; Chahine, 2007; Chu, 
2011; de Miguel et al., 2004; Filatotchev et al., 2011 (the direct 
effect); Maury, 2006; Rondøy et al., 2009; Sacristán Navarro & Gómez 
Ansón, 2011; Silva et al., 2006; Tsao et al., 2009; Chang et al., 2010   
6 Some combinations of these modes are impossible but not others. It is 
clearly not possible to be minimally and maximally professional nor to 
be private and public. Perhaps the most likely combination is that of 
the entrepreneurially operated and wealth dispensing modes.  
7 We can find no reference to this form of conflict that uses the term in this 
context. This is not to say that the problem is never recognized. The 
study by Bertrand and colleagues (2008) is particularly insightful.  
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8 They also found that the stronger the family tie to the affiliate the greater 
the innovation (measured by patents), but explained this not by a 
familial effect on innovation but the practice of appointing the likeliest 
successors to the most promising affiliates.  
9 There is another signal, but it defeats the purpose of attracting external 
equity: holding most of the cash flow rights. Families that do so are 
thereby less inclined to expropriation because doing so expropriates 
themselves (Lin & Hu, 2007; Luo et al., 2011).   
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